The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is heading for presidential elections in December 2023 where incumbent president Félix Tshisekedi is running for a second five-year term.

Other key contestants include Martin Fayulu who referred to the 2018 election results as “a true electoral coup” and proclaimed himself president elect; Moïse Katumbi, former governor of Katanga Province; and Corneille Nangaa, the former president of the National Electoral Commission (CENI), who is in exile.

Former president Joseph Kabila and gynecologist Dr Denis Mukwege are yet to announce their intentions but it is assumed that they could also be eyeing the Congolese presidency.

As his first term is ending, Tshisekedi is recognized for great efforts, decisions and moves which, unfortunately, were not meant to improve the Congolese’s wellbeing.

Let’s first consider the state of affairs in his vast country’s volatile east where he had pledged to bring peace and stability.

Tshisekedi initiated a state of siege, in May 2021, in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, where military authority replaced civilian rule.

Related: Was state of siege in eastern DRC right approach?

The state of siege only made the security situation worse.

A large number of indiscipline, corruption, rape, robbery and looting cases have been reported among officers of Congolese national army against civilians who they are supposed to protect.

The state of siege was extended more than 20 times, with no positive results. Armed groups increased to over 260, with government officials participating in their creations.

Related: Tshisekedi using state of siege to postpone presidential elections

Internally and externally displaced people keep on increasing, persecutions and lynching against Congolese Tutsi are ongoing, and women are still being raped by terror groups including the Rwandan genocidal militia group, FDLR, which the Congolese national army is collaborating with.

Nangaa has said that the Republican Guard of the DRC has recruited FDLR elements in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi.

Tshisekedi is heavily arming FDLR so that it wages war against the M23 rebels in a bid to disrupt the rebels’ cantonment process, a part of regional efforts to restore law and order in eastern DRC through the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes.

Related: DRC: Tshisekedi heavily arming FDLR, preparing for war

In addition to refusing to implement different agreements aimed at halting armed conflicts in eastern DRC, Tshisekedi has been against the East African Community mission in the area.

After an Extra-Ordinary Summit of EAC Heads of State on the security situation in DRC convened in Bujumbura in February, a video clip went viral showing Tshisekedi humiliating Gen Jeff Nyagah, then Commander of EAC Regional Force (EACRF).

In April, Gen Nyagah resigned from the mission, citing “aggravated threat to his safety and a systematic plan to frustrate efforts of the EACRF” as his reason.

Related: DRC: What’s the implication of EACRF commander's resignation?

In his resigning letter to the EAC Secretary General, Gen Nyagah wrote: “There was an attempt to intimidate my security at my former residence by deploying foreign military contractors (mercenaries) who placed monitoring devices, flew drones and conducted physical surveillance of my residence in early January 2023 forcing me to relocate.”

Tshisekedi’s wish was that the EACRF would fight M23, which was not the Regional Force’s mission. The latter’s mission was to create a buffer zone, taking over the localities where the M23 withdraws.

The EACRF is committed to its mandate and has done a praiseworthy job.

Related: DRC: EAC Regional Force’s mandate extended, Tshisekedi unsettled

When Tshisekedi’s expectation failed, he hired Western mercenaries expecting that their combined efforts with his weak army, the FDLR and other local militias, would combine to push out the M23 in a short time. This attained nothing other than escalating violence in the region.

Worse still, Tshisekedi is cracking down on his strong political opponents using military intelligence operatives and presidential guards.

A Human Rights Watch report, in August, pinned Tshisekedi’s government on using the state apparatus to crack down and arrest opposition politicians.

The report noted that: “Congo’s justice system and state security agencies – including the intelligence services, police, and Republican Guard have acted in a partisan manner.”

Tshisekedi is again recognized for high levels of corruption.

In September 2022, leaked videos showed Tshisekedi’s adviser Vidiye Tshimanga promising to win mining licenses for investors in return for a stake in a joint venture.

“If I ask [the president] something, he gives,” Tshimanga said.

In another video clip, Tshimanga was asked who would partner with the investors.

“Me,” Tshimanga replied. The investor then asked if the president or a minister would be involved. “Me, it’s the president,” Tshimanga said.

In an attempt to mask the failures that marked his first term, Tshisekedi has consistently scapegoated Rwanda, lying to the Congolese that Kigali is behind each and everything that went wrong in DRC.

On his March tour in Africa, French President Emmanuel Macron stressed the need for Congolese authorities to look within for solutions to their security challenges, especially in the country’s eastern region, instead of always putting the blame of their challenges on external actors.

“Since 1994, you have never been able to restore the military, security or administrative sovereignty of your country. It's a reality. We must not look for culprits outside,” Macron said.

Tshisekedi fumed.

He knew the world was witnessing the far-reaching consequences of the 2018 electoral fraud.