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DRC: Tshisekedi shoots self in foot by crackdown on opposition ahead of elections

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According to the electoral calendar released on November 26, 2022, by the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), general elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are expected to be held on December 20.  With less than four months to the elections, President Félix Tshisekedi who is expected to vie for a second term is silent on the preparedness of CENI to hold elections.

 

The reason for Tshisekedi’s silence is clear. He is worried that if elections were to be held in a free and fair atmosphere, he would be defeated embarrassingly by the opposition because his five-year term has achieved nothing that he can use to convince the electorate to vote for him. It should be recalled that his win for the first term was marred by controversies and denounced by the opposition as a “fraud” and an electoral coup.

 

The official vote results showed that Tshisekedi won with 38.57 percent of more than 18 million ballots cast, compared with 34.8 percent for Martin Fayulu. Even with allegedly ‘doctored results’ the outcome showed that Tshisekedi was not popular. 

 

The first strategy Tshisekedi is using to keep himself in power is to crackdown on strong political opponents ahead of elections using military intelligence operatives and presidential guards.

 

The accusation brought against members of the opposition has mainly been “undermining state security and being in contact with M23 rebels.” After a wave of arrests of opposition leaders in May, foreign diplomats complained about the politically motivated arrests and demanded an explanation.

 

On June 8, Tshisekedi instructed government ministers and military intelligence officials to host a meeting with foreign ambassadors to present what officials said was evidence for the arrest of politicians. According to reports, the ‘evidence’ did not convince the foreign diplomats.

 

A report released by Human Rights Watch on August 22, pins Tshisekedi’s government on using the state apparatus to crackdown and arrest opposition politicians.

 

It noted that: “Congo’s justice system and state security agencies – including the intelligence services, police, and Republican Guard have acted in a partisan manner.”

 

The UN Joint Human Rights Office also reported in August that “the pre-electoral environment in DRC is increasingly characterized by a narrowing of civic space and political and electoral violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, abductions and threats targeting political opponents, excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators, and hate speech and incitement to violence.”

 

The office warned that such abuses “risk damaging the credibility of the electoral process” and “increase the risk of violence.”

 

On July 15, Congolese civil society groups penned down a memorandum to the National Commission for Human Rights, calling on the government to end the intelligence service’s arbitrary arrests and detentions. 

 

Tshisekedi’s strategy of cracking down and intimidating opposition politicians ahead of elections seems to be backfiring and making him more unpopular among majority Congolese voters.

 

Tshisekedi’s intelligence operatives have mounted abusive searches of residencies of opposition politicians and their close relatives which have angered many. A case in point is when military intelligence agents arrested Salomon Kalondo an adviser of opposition politician Moïse Katumbi on May 30, after which they went and ransacked Kalondo’s 85-year-old mother’s house.

 

“They broke her bed and her bedroom windows as well as wardrobes and a dresser,” leaving her traumatized, Kalondo’s brother Moise Della told Human Rights Watch.

 

Chérubin Okende, a spokesman for Katumbi’s political party and a member of parliament was founded dead on July 13. He was found in his car in Kinshasa with gunshot wounds. Tshisekedi’s hit men were the prime suspects although the government denounced the “assassination’’ and called for an inquiry which is most likely to achieve nothing. 

 

Tshisekedi’s electoral strategy is double-pronged.

 

The first element is a serious crackdown on the opposition by arrests, intimidation, and killing so that if circumstances force him to accept holding elections as scheduled on December 20, then he will have no opposition worth the name to challenge him.

 

The second strategy is to postpone elections with the pretext of the war in the east of the country to give him time to consolidate his popular support base.

 

Whatever the case, whether DRC holds elections in December or not, Tshisekedi has a case to answer on serious human rights violations going on in the country.

 

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