Regional
From Mobutu to Tshisekedi – Only a leader prepared to pay the political cost of cooperating with Kigali will bring peace to the region
![image](webadmin/images/mobutu.jpg-20221114035338000000.jpg)
For longtime observers of the great
lakes region’s tribulations, there is a sense of déjà vu. Some would argue that
Mobutu Sese Seko has been reincarnated as Felix Tshisekedi.
To
understand the decisions that Rwanda takes to preserve its hard-earned peace,
one must go back to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. With that knowledge,
even those who disagree with any of those decisions do so from an informed
point of view. Consequently, fair minded observers are likely to sympathize and
understand the context and rationale of such decisions given the competing
imperatives facing the country, or any other country that would find itself in
similar circumstances.
This
is what happened in 1996 when Rwanda decided to intervene in the then Zaire,
now Democratic Republic of the Congo, in pursuit of the planners and executors
of the genocide who had sought sanctuary there.
The
reincarnation of Mobutu
Those
who disagree with Rwanda’s invasion of Zaire on the grounds of respect for
territorial integrity or other principles which they believe must hold even in
the face of an existential threat, acknowledge that Mobutu was wrong to welcome
people who had just massacred more than a million Africans. He had done so as a
goodwill gesture on behalf of his departed friend and protégé, Juvenal
Habyarimana. They agree that he had gone too far by supporting the reorganization and
rearming of the defeated genocidal regime as it sought to retake power
in Kigali and complete the “unfinished job” of annihilating the survivors of
the genocide.
As
the Washington Post reported
in 1997, the genocidal forces that had found sanctuary in Zaire “had become
Mobutu’s first line of defense” in the war “against Kabila’s rebels”, then
backed by Rwanda. However, rather than defending Zaire, the alliance with
genocidal forces “led directly to the fall of Mobutu”. This alliance had
prompted Kigali to go all in, in support of Kabila. Rwanda’s leaders “thought
[that] doing it halfway would be very dangerous,” as the then Vice President
Paul Kagame said, adding: “We
found the best way was to take it to the end.”
Given
the circumstances at the time, most observers agree that a preemptive strike
was the right response, since it would have been irresponsible, even suicidal,
for Rwanda to wait for the killers, at the time also supported militarily and
diplomatically by France, to attack.
Interestingly,
many are now reluctant to extend the same reasoning to the events currently
taking place in the DRC, most of which are similar to those that took place
prior to Rwanda’s invasion in 1996.
Kinyarwanda
speaking Congolese (Rwandopones) are facing a threat of genocide, with
incitement from different officials. President Tshisekedi has also
dabbled in incitement when he called upon vigilante groups
to support the army in defeat of the “enemy and denounce potential traitors in
the civilian population who serve the enemy’s interests.” Those who
are familiar with the politics of the Great Lakes Region understand that this
is often coded language to eliminate people who are accused of “betraying”
their country through their alleged “sympathy” with the enemy.
It is worth underscoring that the only basis
of these accusations is the cultural ties that the victims share with the
Banyarwanda of Rwanda. In short, it is their identity and not anything they
have done, that renders them targets of violence. As a result, in the streets
across different cities of North Kivu, they have been burnt alive, some even
cannibalized, and their properties destroyed. The message they are receiving
from their Congolese compatriots is “go back to your country.”
Similar events took
place in the Kivus in the early 1990s as Mobutu was facing pressure for
democratization, This is the context that gave rise to the formation by
Rwandophone Congolese of the
nucleus around which Kabila’s rebellion was built, culminating in his
rise to power.
Then
and now, the citizenship of Rwandophone Congolese is contested by Congolese
leaders on the very same basis – their cultural ties with Rwanda. Prior
to Rwanda’s intervention, Mobutu went as far as revoking their
citizenship. And once again, genocidal forces – at the time the FAR which
was later renamed FDLR – are the DRC’s “first line of defense” against the
enemy. Therefore, for longtime observers of the great lakes region’s
tribulations, there is a sense of déjà vu. Some would argue that Mobutu Sese
Seko has been reincarnated as Felix Tshisekedi.
The
contradiction
In
1996, those who supported or sympathized with Rwanda’s actions against Mobutu
because they amounted to self-defense in the face of an existential threat
understood the decision to reach out to Rwandophone Congolese to help them
organize around a shared cause against a common source of hostility and
insecurity. Today the same people find it problematic, even unacceptable, that
a similar alliance around a shared existential threat, given the ideology of
the FDLR, could emerge between Rwanda and the M23 rebellion.
This
contradiction persists for two reasons. One, Tshisekedi is useful for the West
in a different but similar way that Mobutu was during his time. Mobutu’s
closeness with western powers at the time was deemed necessary to counter the
spread of communism in Africa and maintain parts of the continent in the Western
sphere of influence. The war to remove Mobutu happened less than a decade after
the end of the Cold War, when his usefulness to the US in particular and the
West in general, had run its course. They had no reason to preserve him.
As
they often do, the powerful western media which often align very strongly,
albeit with great subtlety with the foreign policies of their countries,
drummed up support for Mobutu’s removal. They articulated its moral basis by
condemning his alliance with genocidal killers. They rightly pointed out that
it was that support that explained Rwanda’s alliance with Rwandophone Congolese
who formed the nucleus of the rebellion before elements around Laurent Desire
Kabila emerged on the scene and took over leadership, in order to nurture a
“liberation” movement with the capacity to rally broad support among the
Congolese people.
Today
the geostrategic environment has shifted, even if the shift may be only in
form, the substance remaining intact. Today, dysfunctional governments in
Congo, including Tshisekedi’s, provide the necessary environment for western corporations to
exploit the country’s vast mineral resources.
Accordingly,
hypocrisy notwithstanding, the very media houses that supported the removal of
Mobutu, are hostile to the emergence of a similar movement despite the facts on
the ground being nothing short of history repeating itself.
Imperialist
activism
More
bizarrely, anti-imperialism activists on the African continent have turned the
moral cause upside down. They have accepted, without critical examination, the
western media’s depiction of Rwanda as the aggressor and have done so despite
their usual skepticism about these media sources. In other words, in their
minds, when it comes to Rwanda western media suddenly cease to be an arm of
imperial propaganda.
Ordinarily,
rights activism takes the side of victims. And in this search for the victim is
where they have fallen prey to western propaganda. Two perspectives prevail on
understanding who the victim in this conflict is. On the one hand is M-23 whose
claims to defend Rwandophone Congolese from the threat of genocide are
validated by the incitement to kill on the part of the authorities of that
country. On the other, is the weakness of the Congolese state that
elicits and receives the support of various rights activists, especially those
like (the Cameroonian-Swiss) Nathalie Yamb and many others who claim to fight
imperialism. What they fail to appreciate, however, is that neither the
weakness of the Congolese state nor its morally deficient cause deserve such
support. I used to be an activist and I know that weakness is not a sufficient
basis for support; one has to be weak and right to deserve the solidarity of
rights activists.
In
this conflict, this activist community finds itself in a moral quagmire: anti-imperialist
activists siding with the empire to denounce Rwanda and M-23. They have allied
with media houses that are owned and run by agents of the empire to rehearse
claims that the objective of the alleged M-23/Rwanda alliance is to exploit
Congolese minerals. Ironically, this is an imperialist narrative whose aim is
to conceal the actual forces of pillage of the Congolese natural
resources: American
and Canadian mineral interests that have the financial resources to
invest in the heavy machinery needed to extract those minerals and the
political influence necessary to send cargo planes operating on make-shift
runways inside Congolese jungles under the protection of MONUSCO.
The
spokesperson of the Ugandan army, the UPDF, Gen Felix Kulayigye underscored this point:
“Congo has imperialists trying to take advantage of its vast resources. There
are places in Congo where a black person cannot go.” In other words, the
discourse that ties Rwanda and M-23 to minerals is a clever imperialist
diversion. And now it has been taken up by African anti-imperialist activists!
These
activists have been in confrontation with Rwandans on social media claiming
that the latter’s passionate defense of M-23 is confirmation that Rwandan
troops are supporting the rebels. I personally think that if intervening in the
DRC was the right thing to do in 1996 when genocidal forces were “Mobutu’s
first line of defense,” then it remains the right thing to do now that FDLR is
Tshisekedi’s first line of defense. This alliance has been confirmed by the
United Nations.
Also,
I think that the passionate defense of M-23 by Rwandans on social media has to
do with their sensitivity regarding genocide. In fact, whenever the incitement
against Rwandophone Congolese reaches fever pitch, there is a feeling inside
Rwanda that the leadership is being “indifferent” to their suffering. I am
convinced, therefore, that if the question of whether to intervene in the DRC
to protect the lives of Rwandophone Congolese arose, the overwhelming majority
of Rwandans would vote in favour. In other words, Rwandans are more likely to
cheer their government’s intervention than merely to show support to M-23.
On
the other hand, activism in favour of an armed intervention whose primary aim
would be to defeat the M-23 unwittingly makes the case for the preservation of
the FDLR and is, therefore, a morally deficient activism.
The
high cost of cooperation
Then,
and now, cooperation is what was needed to uproot the genocidaires. However,
Mobutu chose to treat them as victims and to forge a common front against
Kigali. Since then, politics in Kinshasa has been hostile to cooperation, the
route Kigali prefers. As a result, Tshisekedi is caught between a rock and a
hard place. Since anti-Rwanda
hostility is a political boon in Kinshasa, cooperation would have to be
predicated on one key factor: a leader willing to initiate and sustain such
cooperation.
They
would have to preside over a state that has the capacity to deliver public
services effectively. In that way, it would provide the necessary shield
against elite pressure and constitute a strong basis for seeking reelection. It
would neutralize the myths peddled by the Kinshasa elite that such cooperation
is aimed at naturalizing people of “doubtful nationality” (Rwandophone
Congolese) and balkanizing the country by surrendering part of its territory to
Rwanda and, perhaps Uganda.
It
is foolhardy to pursue cooperation, fail to deliver public services, and then
seek re-election in the DRC. Failure to deliver public services invariably
leads to the need to scapegoat neighbours for internal governance failures. It
focuses the political calculus of DRC leaders on non-cooperation with Rwanda
and hostility towards Rwandophones.
Remarkably,
for a brief period at the start of this round of conflict, Tshisekedi’s main
political competitor, Martin Fayulu, pointed out that the provocation of war in
the Kivu was a diversionary tactic by the president. Fayulu asserted, rightly,
that the actual problems of the DRC were those
of governance. But this moment of clarity by Fayulu did not last. He too
realized that such an argument, as valid as it is, was a political non-starter
in the DRC. He quickly pivoted back to
his, and Mukwege’s, bread and butter issues: “balkanization et nationalite
douteuse”.
So
far Kinshasa’s belligerent attitude has been met with restraint on the part of
Kigali. Rwanda has no appetite for regime change in Kinshasa. It learned the
hard lesson that removing a hostile regime does not ensure long term security.
Neither does it guarantee that the one that replaces it will not pose a worse
threat. Sadly, Rwanda’s restraint has encouraged the elites in DRC to engage in
unending provocations whose intended result, a full-blown inter-state war,
would most likely end up confirming their accusations that Rwanda supports the
M23, a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Similarly,
Rwanda’s reluctance to respond robustly to the provocation “to the end” means
that Tshisekedi has little incentive to cooperate in pursuit of a political
solution that brings lasting peace between the two countries and the region.
This explains why he has turned his back against the Luanda and Nairobi
mechanisms.
Ultimately,
rather than live by the lesson that he ought to have learned from Mobutu,
Tshisekedi has chosen to rely on Rwanda’s reluctance to repeat its own. He has
chosen to live dangerously while claiming on television that
he is prepared to pay the ultimate price in defense of the DRC.
But
only a leader who is ready to pay the high political cost of cooperation with
Kigali will bring peace to the DRC and the region. Tshisekedi is not that
leader.
Source: www.panafricanreview.rw