Regional
Burundi can still make the right choice in the DRC
As fighting continues in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) between government forces (FARDC) – in coalition with various local and
foreign militias, including the genocidal FDLR, Burundian troops and European
mercenaries – and the M23 rebels, there is an urgent need for African leaders
in the Great Lakes region and beyond to reflect on the catastrophic
consequences of a prolonged conflict for the continent’s collective security
and integration prospects.
In this regard, President Ndayishimiye of Burundi, who chairs the
East African Community still has the opportunity to play a crucial role in
saving the peace process led by the same EAC. There are compelling reasons for
prioritizing the EAC’s interests over President Tshisekedi’s ambitions for a
military victory against the M23 rebels.
To begin with, Burundi should avoid the risk of diplomatic
isolation, which is likely to happen if his government continues to supply
troops to its DRC counterpart, thereby undermining the regional consensus
on achieving peace in that country.
While in 2012 there was a widespread desire to single out the M23
among the numerous armed groups in eastern DRC and to blame Rwanda for Congo’s
governance failures, the situation is different now.
It is now widely understood that achieving sustainable peace
requires addressing the root causes of this recurring conflict. They include discrimination,
killings, ethnic cleansing that targets Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese, and
attempts to exterminate Congolese Tutsi.
It was this understanding that led the EAC heads of state to craft
a conflict resolution framework that successfully imposed a ceasefire and the
partial withdrawal of M23 rebels from territories they had captured.
The intervention by President Lourenço of Angola six
months ago, where he, as the African Union mediator, indicated that the M23
rebels had complied with regional demands, should have signaled the region’s
strong support for the EAC-led peace process.
Both Angola’s decision to commit troops to oversee M23’s
cantonment (but only after the success of the Nairobi political process) and the
reluctance by SADC leaders to specify a precise timeline for deployment of
a regional force, further reinforced this support.
Unfortunately, Burundi’s leaders missed these cues. Their decision
to intervene militarily in support of Kinshasa’s refusal to negotiate peace has
reversed the EAC’s modest gains, sending the region back to square one.
Secondly, with Burundian troops fighting not only alongside the
DRC’s national army (FARDC) but also the genocidal group FDLR, there is a risk
that Burundi’s actions could lead to tensions with neighboring Rwanda.
This would further divide the East African Community.
It is the alliance between the DRC army and FDLR that is fueling
similar tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali.
These tensions must be avoided at all costs, as they undermine the
remarkable political rapprochement observed between Kigali and Gitega since
President Ndayishimiye ascended to power.
The commendable normalization process undertaken by the leaders of
both countries has allowed Burundians and Rwandans to move across their borders
without fear of persecution or harassment. It would be disastrous if these
gains went to waste.
Thirdly, there is little for Gitega to gain from its alliance with
Kinshasa.
Immediate financial gains may be appealing to some sections of
Burundi’s political establishment, but these are not worth their weight in
gold.
Unlike the situation in 2012, this time round it is unlikely the
DRC government and its supporters will achieve the ambition of defeating M23
militarily.
Not only are the rebels well-armed, trained, and motivated, but
they are also better prepared for war.
The military setbacks the Congolese army and its allies have
suffered and the capture by M23 of over a hundred Burundian troops in combat,
according to reliable sources, testify to this fact.
Further, in North Kivu, Burundian troops are far from their home
bases and can only depend on the FARDC for logistics and supplies.
Given the rampant corruption in the DRC’s state institutions, the
FARDC is not a reliable partner.
One of Burundi’s natural routes for supplies would have been
Rwanda, through the city of Goma. However, Rwanda is unlikely to cooperate with
a regional actor whose collaboration with its nemesis, the FDLR, is undeniable.
Also, by overextending its reach, Burundi is creating a security
vacuum in South Kivu, where it has a more immediate and legitimate interest in
neutralizing armed groups that threaten its own security and political
stability, such as Red Tabara and FNL.
For all these reasons, Burundi’s leaders must weigh the risks of
widespread insecurity in the region and choose wisely between pursuing financial
gains and working for collective security.
Bilateral security agreements, like those between Uganda and the
DRC or Burundi and the DRC, address legitimate security threats faced by
Kampala and Gitega.
They should not serve as a cover to undermine the EAC’s military
intervention and peace process in the DRC.
Therefore, becoming involved in Kinshasa’s military adventurism
and threatening Rwanda’s security in the process should not be on the agenda of
political leaders in the region.
The EAC peace process had instilled hope in many Congolese,
including the internally displaced and those in refugee camps in Rwanda and
Uganda.
African leaders had distanced themselves from the self-serving
narratives of Western actors on Congo’s crisis who fueled the conflict by
supporting Kinshasa’s desperate attempts to find a scapegoat and repeatedly
chose to ignore discrimination against Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese as one of
the root causes of Congo’s crisis.
Burundi’s decision to break ranks and participate in actions that
further undermine peace and stability in the DRC has extinguished this hope. It
may not be too late for the Ndayishimiye government to change course, reaffirm
its neutrality, order its troops to resume their peacekeeping mandate, and
attempt to salvage the bloc’s credibility.
Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult for the EAC chair to call the next heads of state summit to discuss solutions to the DRC crisis if Burundi is seen by the region as part of the problem.