Regional
Debunking Jason Stearns’ distortions on insecurity in eastern DRC
In
his latest publication in the Congo Research Group (CRG), a so-called
‘independent, non-profit research project dedicated to understanding the
violence that affects millions of Congolese,’ Jason Stearns penned a very
misleading controversial article: “Should we talk of M23 without talking
about FDLR?”
He condemned
a perceived attempt by Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, to draw
equivalence between FDLR and M23, during a press conference in Kigali. Blinken
accused both the DRC and Rwanda of supporting FDLR and M23, respectively. He
said: “There are very credible reports of support for armed groups by all
sides.”
In
his article, Stearns joined Congolese warmongers who expressed disappointment
over Blinken’s failure to condemn Rwanda. Blinken’s call for peaceful solution
to the resurgence of the M23 rebels through the Nairobi process was equally not
well received.
In
addition to blaming Rwanda over DRC failures, Stearns downplays the threat
posed by the presence of Rwandan genocidal forces in eastern DRC and justifies
the FDLR militia’s collaboration with Congolese armed forces (FARDC). The FDLR
are remnants of the masterminds of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in
Rwanda. Despite their known genocidal ideology and agenda, for Stearns, the M23
rebels pose a bigger threat than FDLR. He equally relativizes the hate speech
targeting the Congolese Tutsi population.
His
article was acclaimed by the Government of the DRC as it shifted the blame of
the resurgence of M23 on Rwanda, presenting the DRC government as a mere victim
of Rwanda’s alleged belligerence. It also stirred controversies, on social
media, forcing him to make additional clarifications, through a twitter thread,
that did little to correct his preconceived ideas on the resurgence of M23.
This
article debunks Stearns’ falsehoods in his article. To expose his double
standards and biases, some counter arguments are borrowed from his own book: “Dancing
in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of
Africa,” published in 2011.
DRC
government far from being a victim; It is responsible for M23 resurgence
Stearns
seeks to exonerate the Congolese government from its primary responsibility in
the resurgence of the M23/Makenga faction. He conveniently ignores the fact
that in 2013, the M23 split into two factions – the Jean-Marie Runiga and
Sultani Makenga factions. After their defeat by the Force Intervention Brigade
(FIB)/UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the Makenga
faction fled to Uganda while Runiga’s faction fled to Rwanda. In Rwanda, the
latter group was disarmed and its members are still cantoned in a location far
from the DRC border as required by international law. The weapons seized from
them were thereafter, duly handed over to DRC authorities by Rwanda. As of
today, members of this faction are not involved in the current fight against
DRC.
Despite
the defeat of M23, the Congolese government was requested to formally commit
itself to addressing the M23 grievances, which it acknowledged through the
Nairobi Declaration of December 12, 2013. However, just like in previous signed
agreements, the DRC government later refused to honor its commitments.
Interestingly, Stearns seems to be comfortable with a country that has excelled
in signing and violating agreements to achieve short-term political goals.
Rwanda
did what it could to support President Félix Tshisekedi in his efforts to
restore peace and security in eastern DRC upon his election. Rwanda understood
that cooperation with a legitimate and responsible government would
appropriately address its own security concerns. It also understood that
lasting peace in eastern DRC required implementation of the signed agreements,
including the 2013 Nairobi Declaration, whereby the DRC government committed to
address M23 grievances.
In
2019, relations between Rwanda and DRC significantly improved thanks to the
then shared will by both President Paul Kagame of Rwanda and his Congolese counterpart,
Tshisekedi, to improve relations between their respective countries. The two
countries enhanced cooperation in various areas, including in intelligence
sharing which led to the neutralization of key commanders of Rwandan armed
groups and the repatriation of former combatants and dependents.
With
the facilitation of Rwanda, the Congolese government, on October 28, 2019,
signed a roadmap for the repatriation of ex-M23 members living in Rwanda.
Similarly, Rwanda facilitated the meeting of DRC officials with Congolese
refugees living in Rwanda for their repatriation. The roadmap was never
implemented and the refugees have no home to return to as their country still
refuses to recognize them as Congolese.
President
Tshisekedi faced hostility from some influential actors within the government,
defense and security sectors, the opposition and civil society opposed to the
DRC-Rwanda rapprochement as well as to the repatriation of M23 combatants and
Congolese refugees in Rwanda. Internal wrangles and changes both within his
ruling party and collation as well as within security organs further weakened
his ability to enforce signed agreements with each of the two M23 factions.
This
prompted the Makenga faction to return to DRC in December 2016 and in January
2017, from Uganda. Recently, the group resumed fighting since October 2021,
eight years after its defeat in 2013.
Instead
of addressing its grievances, the DRC government escalated the problem by
listing M23 as terrorist organization and excluding the group from the Nairobi
consultations. The DRC government further unleashed hate speech targeting both
Rwanda and Congolese Tutsi while it’s military, the FARDC, forged a sinister
alliance with genocidal forces, especially the FDLR.
The
DRC's blame-shifting and ostrich policy are problematic and counterproductive.
The
resurgence of the M23 rebellion should primarily be blamed on the DRC
government’s failure to implement signed agreements with the group whose
members are denied their right to Congolese citizenship. Interestingly, while
Stearns proposed a political solution for both FDLR and ADF, he seems to
support DRC's militaristic approach in dealing with M23.
The
Congolese government has a responsibility to address M23 grievances instead of
subcontracting the very genocidal militia that seeks their extermination.
By
Tshisekedi’s admission, subcontracting armed groups in the fight against M23 is
“adding fuel to fire”. However, it seems he has been overpowered by some FARDC
generals and Congolese politicians who exploit the conflict and instability in
the eastern DRC for personal gain.
Rwanda’s
legitimate security concerns are real
The
FDLR remains an ideological and security threat to both Rwanda and DRC. But
Stearns presents the genocidal militia as weak, and allegedly posing no real
threat to Rwanda. Referring to the US's similar positions, in 2009 and 2013,
Stearns cites what the then US Undersecretary of State for Africa, Jendayi
Frazer, called the “grand bargain” to resolve the M23 problem. Stearns suggests
that “admitting that Kigali has legitimate security grievances in eastern
Congo would allow the Rwandan government to save face and walk away from the
conflict with its head held high.”
It
is interesting to observe how Stearns gleefully narrates his role in advocating
against military operations targeting FDLR. After the defeat of M23 by the FIB,
next on the list was FDLR. However, as soon as the M23 was dismantled, the
operation was called off. The biggest winners were, evidently, the FDLR and
Stearns. Like in 2013, Stearns is once again advocating for an unrealistic
“political” solution to the FDLR issue while he is comfortable with the DRC’s
militaristic approach to M23.
To minimize
the threat posed by FDLR to Rwanda, Stearns argues that its strength has been
reduced to 500-1000, and that their last large-scale attack in Rwanda dates
back to 2001. Here, Stearns implicitly suggests that Rwanda should wait until
the FDLR carries out a large-scale attack.
A
simple interrogation can be put to challenge this rather disproportionate
argument. Why, then, is the FARDC allied with the FDLR and actually puts them
at the battle front to fight the M23? Isn’t it, arguably, because the “only
remaining 500 to 1000 men” of the FDLR are collectively more powerful than a
whole FARDC brigade?
If
the FDLR strength has depleted, it is due to various factors, including past
military operations against it, internal wrangles, as well as Rwanda’s efficient
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program, which is lacking in the
DRC.
Contrary
to the wrong picture Stearns wants to paint, the threat posed by the genocidal
force remains real. And, this threat is beyond the militia group’s numbers, which
are not static. The FDLR’s strength and capacity for nuisance increases through
recruitment, training and arms supply which are currently facilitated by its
collaboration with FARDC and other local armed groups.
The
biggest threat of the group lies in its genocide ideology and resilience, its
collaboration with FARDC and local armed groups as well as its capacity to
exploit the absence of state authority. The FDLR indoctrinates and recruits
among the Congolese Hutu community (Nyatura) for self-preservation. This
situation not only endangers the peaceful co-existence of local communities in
eastern DRC but also represents a threat to Rwanda’s security.
The
militia, whose forward base is at a stone throwing distance from Rwanda’s
border with DRC, maintains its genocide ideology and the will to attack Rwanda.
On December 10, 2018, the FDLR carried out attacks in Busasamana, in Rubavu
District, Western Province. Similarly, its splinter groups carried out several
attacks inside Rwanda. One is the so-called Rwanda Movement for Democratic
Change/National Liberation Front (MRCD-FLN) which launched attacks in Nyabimata
and Kitabi areas, Southern Province, in 2018, and in Nyungwe, Western Province,
on June 18, 2022. Another FDLR splinter group, RUD-Urunana, attacked Kinigi in
November 2019 and killed civilians after failing to reach touristic facilities
in the area.
The
FDLR-FARDC coalition also shelled Rwandan territory three times on March 19,
May 23 and June 10, 2022. Besides, FDLR splinter groups have carried out several
other attacks in Nyungwe and Virunga national parks in the past.
The
genocidal militia and its splinter groups continue to harbor plans to conduct
acts of sabotage against Rwanda especially near and around Nyungwe National
Park (Southern Province) and the Virunga National Park (Western Province).
Thus, the preservation of the genocidal forces poses ideological, security and
economic threats to Rwanda, which Stearns ignores.
Stearns
argues that the FARDC have an adversarial relationship with the FDLR and that
they have fought them many times, “including recently”. This statement is not
only a contradiction to verified facts that converge to the current FARDC-FDLR
military alliance against M23. It is also betrays lack of some historical
background knowledge of the genesis of the FDLR and how Rwandan genocidal
forces have always been supported by Congolese leaders since the time of
President Mobutu and sustained by the Kabilas.
Should
he have comprehended these facts, Stearns would have been able to establish the
truth as to why, despite the FDLR's near total defeat following the Umoja Wetu
military operation, in 2009, the militia group came to re-organize itself
through recruitments, arms purchases or looting, through its target operations
to loot arms from other groups including the FARDC itself and through direct
sales of arms to FDLR by some officers of the country’s armed force as
indicated in recent reports in DRC.
The
insecurity status-quo in DRC can only be resolved by taking concrete actions to
reform the national security services, the country’s leadership and through the
promotion of accountability methods in the army and the government.
Trying
to export DRC problems to Rwanda, or to promote some moral equivalence in the
issues of insecurity in DRC cannot solve any problem but sustain them.
Why
talk about FDLR every time we talk about M23?
In
his rhetorical question title, Stearns wonders if we should “talk about the
FDLR every time we talk about M23.” Stearns condemns a moral equivalence
between FDLR and M23 he terms as dangerous. Such moral equivalence is indeed
dangerous but not for the reasons stated by Stearns. He presents the M23 as the
major source of insecurity in eastern DRC and considers FDLR as a minor threat
exploited by Rwanda as scapegoat. Yet, he presents no evidence to support his
argument. Facts on the ground show a different reality and justify why
addressing the issue of M23 requires, first and foremost, the neutralization of
the FDLR.
Nine
years after the defeat of M23, has insecurity in eastern DRC prevailed? The
number of armed groups surged from around 40 (in 2012) to more than 130 armed
groups, a decade later. Contrary to Stearns’ assertion, the rise of these
groups is largely associated with the preservation of genocidal forces in
eastern DRC. Thus, to present the M23 as the biggest threat to peace and
security in DRC is not only wrong but an irrelevant and dangerous diversion.
The M23 is a consequence of the spread of genocide ideology as observed through
stigmatization and hate speech particularly targeting the Tutsi.
The
FDLR is a genocidal group that neither renounced its genocidal intent nor its
ambitions to attack Rwanda. While Stearns rightly recognizes that the group
represents a “serious security threat to Congolese civilians,” he fails to
acknowledge that Congolese Tutsi are the primary targets and victims of the
group, justifying the resurgence of armed groups like M23.
In
addition to being a security threat, FDLR’s genocide ideology represents a
serious threat to the peaceful coexistence of Rwandans and Congolese. While
members of the M23 are denied their right to Congolese citizenship, FDLR
members are encouraged to return to their country. Rwanda has established one
of the most efficient Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
programmes in the region.
In
terms of security threats, facts on the ground equally present a different
picture from Stearns’ portrayal. Credible reports, including the report of the
UN Human Rights Commission, indicate that the number of civilian fatalities
from FARDC, FDLR, Nyatura groups, ADF, and CODECO, is far bigger than that of
M23.
Equating
the M23 to FDLR is misleading and potentially undermines ongoing regional
initiatives meant to address root causes of the conflict in eastern DRC.
Stearns’ efforts to either deny or justify the FARDC-FDLR collaboration as well
as his attempts to minimize the FDLR threat are dangerous and
counterproductive.
Stearns
also overlooks the stigmatization of Congolese Tutsi and the role of the DRC in
the resurgence of the M23. Yet, in Twitter thread, he denied his efforts to
advocate for the preservation of the FDLR.
The
DRC government has the responsibility to address M23 grievances instead of
subcontracting the very genocidal militia that seeks to exterminate a section
of Congolese people. One of the urgent tasks for the DRC government should be
the fight against hate speech and the neutralization of the FDLR and its
splinter groups.
Hate
speech predates M23 resurgence and DRC is behind its spread
Stearns
minimizes anti-Tutsi hate speech and attributes its rise to the resurgence of
the M23. While stigmatization of the Rwandophone community has been prevalent
since DRC independence, the presence of genocidal forces in eastern DRC has
contributed to the spread of hate speech particularly targeting the Tutsi.
Since 1994, Congolese Tutsi are stigmatized and branded as “foreigners”,
“traitors, and Rwanda’s “fifth column”.
Conspiracy
theories (especially Balkanization and Tutsi-Hima Empire theories) have become
prevalent among government officials, Parliamentarians, military officials,
members of the ruling party or its coalition, opposition and civil society
figures in search for cheap popularity or visibility. It would be inappropriate
to give them unnecessary publicity by naming them. For further details,
see @MaishaRdc, a Twitter handle of a group of Congolese students
who document hate speech in the Great Lakes Region, especially in the DRC.
There
is numerous evidence proving that anti-Tutsi hate speech predates the existence
of M23. Interestingly, some of it was documented way before the existence of
M23, including by Stearns in his book, “Dancing in the Glory of
Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa.”
Stearns
wrote: “It is amazing to what extent the ethnic stereotypes and
conflicts that were born in Rwanda have contaminated the rest of the region. No
other image plagues the Congolese imagination as much as that of the Tutsi
aggressor. No other sentiment has justified as much violence in the Congo as
anti-Tutsi ideology.”
In
the same book, Stearns witnessed entrenched anti-Tutsi sentiments among his own
Congolese acquaintances: “When I first lived in Bukavu, in 2001, I spent a
lot of time with a local family. The mother of the family, a soft-spoken
twenty-seven-year-old who was studying development at a local university, was,
like most of the town, bitterly opposed to what she called the “Tutsi
occupation of the eastern Congo” (...) One day when I was arguing that you had
to understand Tutsi paranoia, as it has its roots in the massacre of up 800,000
Tutsi in Rwanda during the genocide, she replied: “Eight hundred thousand?
Obviously it wasn’t enough. There are still some left.”
The
“soft-spoken” Congolese mother who seemingly regrets that there are still some
Tutsi left is a typical representation of the prevailing anti-Tutsi
sentiments. Stearns’ choice of words to describe legitimate fear of Tutsi as
“paranoia” tells it all.
Twenty
one years later, the threat posed by hate speech and stigmatization of the
Tutsi remains real and is on the rise. It is further compounded by the
resumption of FARDC-FDLR collaboration in the fight against M23.
The
so-called “Tutsi paranoia” led to killing of Congolese Tutsi, civilians and
military officers alike, in atrocities reminiscent of the pre-genocide period
in Rwanda. Despite calculated condemnation by Congolese authorities, none of
those responsible for hate speech and Tutsi killings was taken to court.
Hate
speech is slowly consuming the Congolese house and needs to be switched off before
it’s too late.
Stearns’
inability to recognize the danger, and his attempt to blame it on the victims,
are staggering.
FARDC-FDLR
collaboration predates the resurgence of M23 and should not be justified
Stearns
conveniently attempts to either deny or justify collaboration of the Congolese
army with the genocidal forces. Coalescing with a genocidal group is
irresponsible and dangerous. There should be no justification for the DRC
government in preserving and collaborating with a genocidal force that seeks to
eliminate a group of its own nationals.
The
FDLR poses serious security and ideological threat to Rwanda, DRC and the
region. Its neutralization is essential for lasting peace and security in the
region.
Similar
to the DRC government and other Congolese warmongers, Stearns is pushing for a
repeat of the 2013 scenario when M23 political grievances were ignored and its
defeat presented as essential for restoring long-lasting peace and stability in
eastern DRC.
The
threat posed by genocidal forces, especially the FDLR and responsibility of
government of DRC of not honoring the signed agreement with the then CNDP were
overlooked. Like in 2013, Stearns is advocating against military operations
targeting genocidal forces which are among the root causes of instability in
eastern DRC. While he opines that military operations against FDLR are
dangerous and prone to producing more armed groups, he promotes the DRC
militaristic approach to the resurgence of a faction of M23, contrary to the
letter and spirit of the Nairobi process.
Unfortunately,
Stearns suggests that the DRC should not count on the good faith of its
neighbors. That long-term solution to the violence – including the one
allegedly instigated by the Rwandan government – will come from a “stronger and
more responsible Congo.”
It
seems that the Congolese government heeded Stearns’ advice, as it is actively
engaged in seeking external military support to fight its own people.
After
the disappointing visit by Blinken to Kinshasa, and the unsuccessful DRC effort
to drum up SADC military support, the Congolese government is currently
courting Russia for arms supplies, as evidenced by the August 15-18 visit of
the Congolese Minister of Defense, Gilbert Kabanda Rukemba.
Time
will tell.
Source:
www.newtimes.co.rw