In March, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s President Felix Tshisekedi appointed the country’s former vice president Jean-Pierre Bemba, who was imprisoned for more than 10 years for war crimes, as defence minister in a sweeping, and somewhat surprising, government reshuffle.

 

His appointment was part of an overhaul of the 57 member-cabinet, which the president’s spokesperson said was “urgent and necessary”, in an announcement on national television but no further details were given.

 

The reshuffle, which was more extensive than observers had predicted, came just months before a presidential election on December 20, in which Tshisekedi is determined to seek a second term. Analysts are not wrong when they say the overhaul of the DRC’s 57-member-cabinet just months before the election is a ‘deeply political shuffle’.

 

Bemba’s appointment and cabinet reshuffle by Tshisekedi, close to elections, is largely aimed at tightening his grip on power.

 

Tshisekedi also appointed former Chief of Staff, Vital Kamerhe, as Minister of Economy. Kamerhe was in 2020 sentenced to 20 years in prison for embezzling around $50 million.  He was accused of misappropriating funds allocated to the construction of houses for the military and police, which was part of a programme implemented by Tshisekedi.

 

Kamerhe was a right-hand man of Tshisekedi between 2018 and 2019. In June 2021, his 20-year sentence was reduced to 13 years in prison, on appeal. 

 

He was granted provisional release in December 2021,

The big question here is; what lies behind Tshisekedi’s appointment of Bemba and Kamerhe?

 

How it all started

 

Having been declared the winner of a contested election in December 2018, Tshisekedi’s Cap pour le Changement (CACH) party sealed a governing alliance with his powerful predecessor, Joseph Kabila’s Front commune pour le Congo (FCC).

 

But the arrangement did not work in the President’s favour.

 

It resulted in pro-Kabila allies occupying two-thirds of cabinet positions and limiting Tshisekedi’s ability to govern.

 

Tshisekedi announced the dissolution of the alliance in December 2020. When he facilitated a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, Sylvestre Ilunga Ilunkamba (Kabila’s ally) in January 2021, Tshisekedi took another step in his strategy to reshape parliamentary support in his favour and reduce Kabila’s influence.

 

At the beginning, Tshisekedi hoped he could count on the support of opposition heavyweights: Möise Katumbi and Jean-Pierre Bemba, with whom he intended to build a new ‘Sacred Union’ majority.

 

When this didn’t happen, Tshisekedi ran back to his drawing board and started maneuvers in preparation for the 2023 elections.

 

While Tshisekedi has had some early successes, the aims and make-up of the Sacred Union are still unclear. The people that he courted eventually divorced him before the marriage happened. It’s concerning that the exercise resembles the country’s past power-sharing arrangements, whose record is poor, when it comes to delivering democracy, stability and good governance.

 

Before Ilunkamba’s removal, the dismissal of National Assembly speaker, Jeanine Mabunda, just a few days after Tshisekedi’s speech in December 2021, showed the president’s determination to break up the alliance.

 

He weighed in heavily on all the initiatives that followed to consolidate his power base. This includes appointing a provisional bureau led by Mboso N’kodia Mpwanga to conduct current business until the election of a new speaker in Parliament.

 

Mboso is a veteran of Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime, a former FCC member and currently the most senior Member of Parliament in the National Assembly.

 

The president won over 200 of the 367 pro-Kabila MPs, who agreed openly and in writing to support his actions.

 

As he gained the upper hand, the balance of power swiftly changing and slipping from his hand, Tshisekedi thought dumping Kabila’s men was to work for him but it was instead going to backfire.

 

When he appointed Senator Modeste Bahati Lukwebo to serve as the ‘informateur’ charged with identifying members of a new majority in the National Assembly, the formalization of the process was set in motion. Lukwebo is leader of the Alliance Démocratique du Congo et Alliés, and an FCC dissident.

 

This was the most delicate part of his plan to capture a new majority in Parliament. A constitutional court decision lifting the floor-crossing ban on MPs provided the legal basis for the exercise.

 

Lukwebo had just made official the identified new majority composed of 391 MPs. It comprises a wide range of individuals from various political parties. They are all part of the Sacred Union bloc but lack a shared vision, commitment and focus – apart from weakening Kabila’s control or preserving their positions.

 

More importantly, it was not clear what this new majority could achieve in Tshisekedi’s remaining days in office.

 

The content and objectives of the Sacred Union lack clarity and politically severe differences are evident between Tshisekedi and some of his major allies, including Bemba.

 

Politicians in the DRC are no strangers to opportunism and sabotage, and the presence of hardliners such as Lambert Mende Omalanga, former communications Minister, and Ilunkamba, heightened suspicions.

 

The allocation of government positions before the appointment of the new cabinet is also at the root of the disagreements.

 

Tshisekedi’s actions to lift the country out of chronic political crisis and insecurity failed. He is now maneuvering. His recent appointments signal desperation.

 

He is trying to create a false impression that his government is all inclusive, whereas the fact is that many key positions are filled with his Luba tribesmen.

 

Bemba comes from Equateur province while Kamerhe hails from Bukavu in eastern DRC. Tshisekedi also hopes that by bringing Bemba close, MLC can help him to fight against M23.

 

Will Tshisekedi’s maneuvers or tactics work? No.