In April, Rwandan researcher Tom Ndahiro penned a revealing Op-Ed, “Note to Kampala – Rwigema is ours; not yours,” that shed light on the role of Rwandan refugees in the 1981-86 National Resistance Army (NRA) liberation war that brought Ugandan dictator Yoweri Museveni to power.

Formed in 1981, the NRA, the military wing of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), was a rebel army that waged a guerrilla war against the government of Milton Obote, and later that of Tito Okello. Upon capturing power, the NRA became the national army.

By the time that the victorious NRA entered Kampala, in 1986, more than a quarter of its 16,000 combatants were Banyarwanda, while Fred Rwigema, a Rwandan, was its deputy commander. After the NRA captured power in 1986, Rwigema – who was amongst the initial 27 armed fighters who took to the bush in 1981 to begin the guerilla war – became the deputy Minister of Defence.

As Ndahiro noted, before and after the capture of Kampala the 1st, 7th, 11th, 13th, 19th, and 35th NRA battalions were predominantly made up of Banyarwanda.

In conversations with fighters who were with the NRA since 1981, Ndahiro noted, they could name by heart, without needing to crosscheck any document, at least 80 of their comrades who were commanders in the NRA war.

“They talked about their colleagues who are still alive and remembered fondly those who were killed in battle in the NRA, describing the circumstances of their death in the line of fire. Moreover, they said that they felt a responsibility, on behalf of their fallen comrades, of refreshing the minds of the authorities in Kampala who seem to have suddenly forgotten how they got in power,” Ndahiro wrote.

“You want to know all the commanders who were in the NRA or just the most senior,” a former NRA and RPA officer, now retired, asked him, before volunteering to start with the Brigade Commanders – Lt Col Adam Wasswa, Major Chris Bunyenyezi, Major Stephen Ndungutse, and Major Sam Kaka, who was the NRA’s Military Police Commander.

“They can’t forget Captain Ndamage. He commanded three battalions and was killed by enemy fire in Gulu,” Ndahiro’s source said, before going into details of some of the heroics of the Banyarwanda in the NRA war.

Ndahiro also met another comrade of the NRA who was equally astonished that the authorities in Kampala don’t recall the Banyarwanda commanders.

“They don’t remember any commanders?” he asked rhetorically before counting off a list of Commanding Officers (Cos) and their NRA battalions, including, Captains Tadeo Gashugi (9th btn), Dodo Twahirwa (21st), Mico Edison (35th), Wilson Bagire (13th), Edward Karangwa (95th), Sam Byaruhanga (6th), Wahabu (55th), and Lt Fred Nyamurangwa, the commander of the 27th battalion.

Ndahiro added: “Another comrade quickly shot off a list of commanders: Cyiza Willex, Boniface Bitamazire, Thadeo Gashumba, John Gashumba, Vedaste Kayitare, Paul Katabarwa, Fred Maregenya, John Gashugi, Emmanuel Kanamugire, Matayo Twagirumukiza, and Nathan Ngumbayingwe, among so many of Kampala’s forgotten.

“After these discussions, I came out with the feeling that had I talked to ten former NRA commanders the list of their Banyarwanda comrades could have easily shot up to 100 commanders that the authorities in Kampala say were ‘anonymous’.”

It is one thing to forget, Ndahiro noted, and quite another to refer to the commanders who got you where you are as “Johnie-come-lately,” a slight that Banyarwanda joined at the end of the war.

“But imagine an army that makes commanders people who have just joined the war instead of those who have experience. In fact, they were commanders because of their experience in battle. They have even shamelessly forgotten Col Charles Musitu who was with them since the FRONASA days in the 1970s. If they can forget him, surely this is a case of acute amnesia that won’t allow them to remember who captured Kampala, as we shall see below.”

“Imagine the character of people who are so eager to dismiss the contributions of their comrades that they are ready to make the preposterous claim that the Banyarwanda who were at the ranks of Colonel, Major, Captain in 1986 had just joined the NRA,” Ndahiro wrote.

And he asked – what kind of army gives entry-level ranks of Colonel, or was this a special privilege reserved only for the Banyarwanda? Of course, he continued, they were fierce commanders who earned those ranks despite, not because of, being Banyarwanda.

They didn’t benefit from tribalistic favoritism as some did.  “How can they forget the heroism of Captain (Jo1) Ngoga who commanded the company that captured Kololo Summit View, which turned out to be decisive in the capture of Kampala as government soldiers deployed on this hill were shelling and causing major casualties to NRA’s 1st and 7th battalions that were advancing from Clock Tower towards the city center to capture Parliament and Radio Uganda? It is after the action of this Munyarwanda commander that NRA forces were able to move into the city to capture Kampala. It’s unforgettable!”

Ndahiro also brings to the readers’ attention  an ambush in 1984, in Singo, that almost claimed Gen David Tinyefunza and other Ugandan commanders, including Gen Henry Tumukunde, when a small unit of Banyarwanda soldiers and commanders, Kangaho and Gatsinzi, stormed to their rescue. As noted, Tinyefunza had been chief of intelligence and was left in charge of NRA headquarters and Sick Bay in Singo. In the Sick Bay were Tumukunde, who had been shot in the leg, and other commanders, who Kampala often tries to lionize at the expense of Banyarwanda. Only a small force was at the Headquarters; others had gone to attack Hoima.

Tinyefunza received information of an impending enemy attack on the Headquarters. Based on this intelligence tip, Tinyefuza took a decision to immediately shift the headquarters (and Sick Bay) from Singo. As he was moving his forces and the sick, they fell in an enemy ambush.

With their lives in danger, the small unit of Banyarwanda fighters initiated a surprise attack, and quickly neutralized the enemy. These gallant commanders were later killed in different battles shortly after. Gatsinzi fell in Gulu while Kangaho fell at Birembo, near Kabamba in Mubende, as he fiercely tried to dismount an enemy who had a machine gun and was causing serious losses to the NRA force; this was shortly after the attack on Kabamba II when the fighting between the NRA and UNLF (government forces) heated up.

These are the gallant fighters that the authorities in Kampala are erasing, Ndahiro wrote, by saying that “they must have fought anonymously.” According to Ndahiro, a touch of class would have these shameless people belittle those who are still alive but not their deceased comrades; they have even forgotten those they once sang about in the “melancholic song honoring the fallen brave comrades by name – Fellow Combatants” like the late Rwamukaga and Kangaho. 

As the battle heated up and courageous Banyarwanda like Kangaho were falling to enemy fire Museveni had left for Sweden. Even then, it was Banyarwanda soldiers who minded Museveni’s security.

“We escorted him through Kiwanguzi, Mpoma, Mabira, to Lake Victoria” where he crossed by boat first to Kenya and then Sweden. Museveni returned in 1985 during the peace talks. The NRA had reached Katonga. During his absence, the NRA was under the command of a Munyarwanda, Gen FRwigema, who had consolidated the force for the final offensive to take the vital towns of Kasese, Fort Portal, Mbarara, and Masaka that basically led to the submission of the enemy.

Tumwine, a Ugandan, had been at Sick Bay since 1981 after he was shot in the eye at Kabamba. In 1983 Tumwine had been evacuated to Nairobi for treatment. In his autobiography titled “Combatants: A memoir of the Bush War and the Press in Uganda,” NRA journalist William Pike reveals that Tumwine remained in Nairobi from 1983 till 1986 when the war was over.

However, Tumwine returned to take over the position of army commander that Rwigema had effectively assumed during the entire period of the war, although he (Rwigema) had formally remained Deputy Army Commander throughout the entirety of the war.

Stephen Kashaka, is one of the “gallant” Ugandan commanders that Kampala now tries to lionize at the expense of Banyarwanda.  But Kashaka, who was the commander of the 5th battalion, followed the footsteps of many Ugandan commanders who run away when the battle heated up. His last act on the battlefield was to rob a bank and a Diana lorry before taking off, only to reappear in 1986 after the war was won already. He was arrested for desertion.

“In short, with a force of close to nearly 4,000 Rwandans, experienced fighters and commanders at all levels, who crossed over to liberate their country on October 1, 1990, the authorities in Kampala cannot shamelessly say that Museveni didn’t rely on this force to get to power,” Ndahiro wrote.

Back to Rwigema. Kampala has always tried to use Rwigema as a propaganda tool when the least they should do is honor him, Ndahiro noted. In this campaign they have tried to oppose him to Rwanda, “but Rwigema is ours, not theirs,” a former comrade of his in the NRA and RPA observed.

First of all, Rwigema, the proud Rwandan he was, would not be happy with and would, in fact, despise this attempt to use him as a propaganda prop that diminishes the contribution of his fellow Banyarwanda.

Secondly, if isolating Rwigema is meant as some form of recognition then they wouldn’t try to reduce him to a mere Museveni escort, “Museveni kept some of them, particularly Rwigyema and Kagame, as his personal bodyguard platoon in order to maintain them as soldiers.”

Rwigema and Kagame were far from escorts. Their presence in the NRA struggle motivated many Banyarwanda, commanders and rank-and-file whose contributions the Kampala authorities now want to erase, into joining Museveni’s rebellion against Obote.

As for Rwigema, Ndahiro noted, if they truly valued his contributions the author’s paymasters would start with the acknowledgment that in 1980 he rescued Museveni from sure death at the hands of Obote soldiers at a roadblock in Kireka.

Even in this story, as they have done many times, Janet Museveni tries to divert credit of Rwigema’s heroic decisiveness to Salim Saleh (Janet Museveni’s autobiography: “My Life’s Journey” page 106). Except that Muhoozi Kainerugaba recalls as a 6-year-old that it was in fact Rwigema who was the hero of the day (Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba relives his closest contact with death). Janet was a grown woman when her husband was saved from death but it is the memory of a 6-year-old that recalls with clarity what took place that day.

If they were grateful to Rwigema’s contributions, instead of using him as a propaganda prop, they would at least acknowledge that they owe their lives to him; no grateful person forgets a near-death experience. Moreover, they would also admit that he was in fact the Army Commander of the NRA for the entirety of the NRA struggle when Museveni was away with his wife and children in Sweden.

Almost the whole company of soldiers protecting Museveni after 1986 were Banyarwanda. The Presidential Protection Unit (PPU) had to be reconstituted after they left in 1990. Capt Charles Muhire, the PPU’s operations and training officer (OPTO) and Capt Charles Ngoga, the PPU Company Commander (OC), were some of the Rwandans that left the unit when the Rwandan liberation war started, in 1990.

Speaking of the insurgency in the north, Ndahiro noted, almost the entire fighting force that was deployed there comprised Banyarwanda. The few Bahima officers who were deployed there abandoned the frontline preferring the lights and sausages in Kampala.

The surprise departure of the Banyarwanda officers was especially felt when in 1995 a unit of Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) officers commanded by then Major (now Maj Gen) Andrew Kagame was sent to Uganda, at Museveni’s request, to secure key installations in Entebbe, Jinja, and Kampala.

For 12 months, Maj. Kagame’s artillery and anti-aircraft battle-hardened force secured Entebbe International Airport, the strategic radar at Nsamizi (also in Entebbe near the president’s residence), Owen Falls Dam, and the major sugar factories in Lugazi, including Madvhani.

As installations of strategic economic importance, Entebbe airport and Owen Falls Dam were identified for special focus of RPA forces to secure with heavy firepower. Museveni had received credible intelligence that a hostile neighboring country was preparing a raid on Uganda; it would conduct an air raid on key installations while Joseph Kony’s group would match southwards towards Jinja and Kampala.

Museveni didn’t want to take chances and knew where to find a fierce army, and requested for it.  “If they want to share bush war stories, we have more and can expose them. They should be careful. They are opening pandora’s box because we will say these things and they won’t know where to hide,” warned a retired Rwandan officer of the NRA and RPA.