Opinion
How Rwanda dodged the bullet of International NGOs
I previously had high hopes in the role of International Non-Government Organisations (INGOs) in bringing about positive change. However, the more I interacted with them and reflected on their reporting on Rwanda, especially when it comes to the efforts the country has put into resolving the consequences of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, the more I became disillusioned and started questioning their purpose. While I blame this initial trust in INGOs on my naïve understanding of the way the world operates, I am still intrigued by Rwanda’s bad relationship with most of these organizations and the activities of the civil and political rights ‘activists’ representing them. Given the complexity of the causes of this bad relationship, it is fair to argue that the conflict is too deep to be resolved anytime soon. Here is why.
First,
post-genocide Rwanda started rather stubbornly. In less than five years after
the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, Rwanda expelled about 40 INGOs that were
deemed redundant. The decision left all members of the INGOs industry in utter
shock. Some had not even opened their briefcases when they were made to pack
and leave. In parallel, Rwanda decided to forcibly repatriate over two million
refugees that were held hostages in refugee camps by the defeated genocidal
forces in the Eastern DR Congo (Zaire then), a move which deprived these
organisations of their raison d’être and milking cows. In light of this, one
can safely assume that these are “offences” Rwanda committed that INGOs are
still unable to forgive.
Second,
Rwanda has an unorthodox way of governance. For instance, it is common that, in
post-conflict societies, groups of international “experts” in human rights and
transitional justice are invited for endless conferences and meetings to
discuss approaches to resolving the legacies of the violent past. For Rwanda,
the reflection meetings held in the Office of the President from May 1998 to
March 1999 (famously known as Village Urugwiro Meetings), which set the
foundation upon which the country is governed, were internally driven. These
meetings led, among other things, to the establishment of the Gacaca courts (an
indigenous justice mechanism) to address the issue of hundreds of thousands of
genocide suspects held in prisons.
The
INGOs’ disapproval of this inward-looking approach – which rendered the
international “experts” redundant – is demonstrated by their rejection of the
Gacaca courts. This rejection was expressed even before the mechanism was
understood. Again, Rwanda ignored INGOs’ criticisms. Today, the Gacaca courts
system is studied as one of the most genius human inventions in the justice
sector. It demystified the process of access to justice and substantiated the
idea of rendering justice in the name of the people: men and women of
integrity, selected by their neighbours, were able to resolve about two million
cases in 10 years while providing a combination of punitive and reconciliatory
justice. This, too, will never be forgiven by INGOs. For instance, Human Rights
Watch has relentlessly voiced its hostility to the Gacaca Courts and has
exploited the world’s ignorance of this system to
advocate against the extradition of genocide suspects.
As
if the Gacaca Courts weren’t unorthodox enough, Rwanda’s constitution provides
for a system of governance that is based on power-sharing. As per article 62 of
the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 2003 (as revised in 2015), the
President and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies cannot be members of the
same political organization. It also stipulates that “a political organisation
holding the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies cannot have more than
fifty (50%) per cent of Cabinet members.” The same provision requires the Parliament
to reflect all various social categories of people in Rwanda. In addition,
Article 59 of the said constitution provides for a National Consultative Forum
of Political Organisations, allowing all interested political organisations,
including those not represented in the Parliament, to contribute to ongoing
debates on matters of national interest. This power-sharing arrangement has, to
a large extent, left INGOs with no option but to start courting individuals
with fringe ideas, especially those peddling genocide denial and promoting
violence, which became the conveyor belt of INGOs’
politically charged advocacy.
Moreover,
it is well-known that the legitimacy of INGOs, especially those operating in
Africa, feeds on governments’ failure to connect with the people. In the past
27 years, the Government of Rwanda has been different; it has been building a
welfare state that is critical of itself, transparent and accountable. All
government officials and actors are expected to perform their responsibilities
by observing the highest moral standards, and citizens can report even minor
transgressions to any of the annual forums such as the National Retreat,
Imihigo or Umushyikirano, or through a mere tweet to the President. This has
left INGOs with no choice but to scratch for the potential hidden truth through
rumours.
To make
matters worse, the Government of Rwanda has adopted a combative approach
towards the multiple attempts to discredit its choices, policies and actions.
This means that Rwanda will rebut every uninformed or ill-intentioned criticism
levelled against it. This, to INGOs, makes Rwanda too harsh to its critics,
especially when it points out their inaccurate and malicious reporting, which
results from either certain limitations of these organisations, such as their
limited number of staff on the ground and the lack of knowledge needed to
contextualize Rwanda’s choices, or their determination to discredit the
government.
Similarly, Rwanda
will prosecute, through all means possible, whoever crosses the line of
criticism and chooses violence as a means to express dissent. Remarkably,
the resentment from members of INGOs and their aforementioned flirting with
fringe elements have led them to justify
violence against ordinary Rwandans, which they view as an acceptable way to
express political dissent.
Rwanda’s
refusal to allow unchallenged reporting makes members of the INGOs nervous
since such an approach undermines their credibility whenever their reports are
inaccurate, as is often the case. Ironically, they have never considered that
their contemptuous and confrontational approach, which also undermines the
government’s credibility, warrants a similar attitude on the part of their
target.
This
situation has left INGOs focusing on frivolous and controversial criticisms.
One such criticism is that Rwanda’s stability is a result of its tight control
of the media, civil society and political parties. This idea fails to factor
in Rwanda’s
commendable socio-economic achievements, which might be the best
explanation as to why no insurgent group has been able to gain the requisite
popular support to challenge the government. It also fails to acknowledge that
wherever such control or influence over the activities of the media, civil
society and political parties was left to INGOs, it invariantly led to
instability.
Another
frivolous claim of INGOs is that the promotion of national identity, Ndi
Umunyarwanda, is contradictory to the idea that the genocide was committed
against the Tutsi as if Rwandans are incapable of understanding nuances. Or
that the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities are banned in Rwanda, which
is a misrepresentation meant to paint the government’s deliberate and
intentional efforts in pursuing unity as forcing reconciliation upon Rwandans.
All
these and many more criticisms rotate around the alleged absence of freedom of
expression, which brings to mind an anecdote that is illustrative of the
persisting misrepresentations of Rwanda. There was a small exchange between two
Rwandans, a participant in a transitional justice study tour and a speaker to
the group, who happens to be a strong supporter of Ndi Umunyarwanda.
Paraphrased, the point put forward by the former to the latter was: “You know,
when you see in Europe, after the Holocaust, it is the majority, the Europeans,
who decided to never kill the Jews (and other minorities) again, and adopted
several measures.
But
in Rwanda, we do not see the collective majority voice, expressed as Hutu, to
give the assurance to Tutsi (‘the minority’) that the genocide will never
happen again.” The speaker responded thus: “When we achieve Ndi Umunyarwanda,
we will not have majority or minority anymore. We will all be Rwandans, and the
protection will be extended to all nationals instead of being a sort of treaty
signed between two groups or a promise from one group to another.” The reason I
am bringing this story is to demonstrate that the idea that Rwandans are not
asking each other hard questions by exercising their freedom of speech is a
myth propagated by foreigners. This constant and internal conversation is not
meant to attract international media, and, sometimes, it takes place in forums
where INGOs are not involved.
Rwanda might not be providing space for street battles to visualize our freedom of expression, but we live in the assurance that all its government agencies will respond to a mere tweet reporting an injustice. And as long as this connection exists, INGOs will remain hostile to any positive development in Rwanda as the connection denies them the space to operate – supervise and arbitrate the disputes – in Rwanda as they do in some other African countries.